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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Warren L. Mengis*
Introduction
On December 18, 1986, the Supreme Court of Louisiana approved
new rules of professional responsibility and declared that they were to
become effective on January 1, 1987.1 These rules, patterned after the
American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Model Rules) adopted in August of 1983, were the work of a task
force of the Louisiana State Bar Association (LSBA). This task force
had been charged with the responsibility of studying and evaluating the
ABA Model Rules and reporting to the House of Delegates and Board
of Governors.
The adoption of these rules is significant to all practitioners because
they have made several major changes from the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code). First are changes in the format. The Code's short
axiomatic norms (Canons) followed by aspirational objectives (Ethical
Considerations-EC's) and mandatory rules (Disciplinary Rules-DR's)
have been supplanted by fifty-two black letter rules which in form
resemble a Restatement. All of the rules are mandatory with the exception
of Rule 6, which deals with pro bono activities. Although the ABA
Model Rules include both a preamble and comments to the rules, our
supreme court did not adopt either. The task force, however, in its
report to the House of Delegates, suggested that the introductory com-
ments in the ABA Code, the "comments" under each of the Model
Rules, and other materials in the ABA document should be considered
as precatory to any interpretation or application of the Louisiana version
of the Model Rules, except to the extent that they are inconsistent with
the rules adopted by the House of Delegates.
Along with the format change, the careful reader will observe a
change in direction from a strong emphasis on the lawyer's duty to the
client to a more balanced emphasis on duty to the system of justice
and duty to others. One very respected writer on professional respon-
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sibility has called this a change from a "loyalty code" to an "integrity
code."
2
Other changes are also of major importance to the practitioner.
Rule 1.1(b) requires the lawyer to comply with the minimum requirements
of continuing legal education prescribed by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
Mandatory continuing legal education was adopted by the supreme court
at the same time it adopted the new rules; however, the effective date
of the requirement of continuing legal education is January 1, 1988.
Rule 1.4 requires the attorney to give his client sufficient information
to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the
representation and to keep him reasonably informed about the status
of his case or business.
Rule 1.5, dealing with fees, is quite similar to the provisions of DR
2-106 of the Code, but there are some changes. A new client shall be
told the basis or the rate of the fee, either before or within a reasonable
time after the representation begins. It is recommended that this infor-
mation be put in writing. All contingent fee agreements must be in
writing, and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined.
At the conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer must provide
the client with a written statement giving the outcome of the matter,
showing the remittance to be made to the client, and providing the
method of the remittance determination. Attorneys who perform under
contingent fee contracts should immediately revise their forms to track
the requirements of Rule 1.5(c).
Two other changes are accomplished in Rule 1.5. Contingent fees
are now prohibited in domestic relation matters if that fee is contingent
upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony, support,
or property settlement. This rule seems to at least partially overrule
Olivier v. Doga,3 which held that once a separation or a divorce was
obtained, a contingent fee thereafter established could be based on the
amount of property which the attorney secured for his client in the
separation of the community.
Another change involves referral fees. Under the Code, such fees
were prohibited unless the referring attorney did some of the work on
the case, and even then the fee had to be. commensurate with the work
done. Under the new rule, the referring attorney may share in the fee
under either the proportion of work rule, or by a written agreement
with the client in which each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the
representation.
Perhaps the most significant change from the Code is the latitude
now given to the attorney to represent conflicting and adverse interests.
2. Patterson, An Inquiry into the Nature of Legal Ethics: The Relevance and Role
of the Client, I Geo. J. Legal Ethics 43, 44-45 (1987).
3. 384 So. 2d 330 (La. 1980).
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The old Canon 9 "appearance of improprietary" has now been sup-
pressed and the lawyer may place himself between two clients, or between
a client and a former client with interests materially adverse, provided
each client or former client consents to the representation after con-
sultation. The rules add, however, that when representation of multiple
clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include
an explanation of the implications of the common representation, along
with the advantages and risks involved. 4 Rule 2.2 even permits the lawyer
to act as intermediary between clients provided the effect on the attorney-
client privilege and the implications of the common representation, in-
cluding the advantages and risks involved, are fully explained to each
client and each consents to the common representation. Even so, the
lawyer must believe that he can undertake the mediation impartially and
without material prejudice to the interests of either client. With all due
respect to those who drafted the Model Rules, these provisions are a
trap for the unwary and an invitation to a malpractice action. This is
particularly true when the feelings of the two "clients" may be smol-
dering.
Another significant addition to Louisiana's ethical rules is Rule 3.6
on trial publicity. The Code simply referred the attorney to the local
rules of court. Rule 3.6 sets out an attempted balancing of free press
versus fair trial and adopts the standard of "a substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding." The clear and present
danger standard, which was adopted by the Louisiana Supreme Court
in Economy Carpets v. Better Business Bureau,5 appears to be overruled.
Rule 5.1 helps to clear up an area of confusion concerning the
responsibilities of a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over an-
other lawyer and the responsibility of the subordinate lawyer to the
supervising attorney. Rule 5.2 makes it clear, however, that the sub-
ordinate lawyer is subject to the new rules, notwithstanding the fact
that he acted at the direction of another attorney.
The only rules which are not mandatory are Rules 6.1 through 6.4,
dealing with pro bono publico service. Virtually all of the information
contained therein was contained in the ethical considerations under the
Code. Thus, there are no surprises.
Finally, it should be pointed out that direct mail advertising is now
permitted in Louisiana pursuant to Rule 7.3. This is different from the
ABA Model Rules which prohibit mailing to a select group, although
a general mailing is permitted. Louisiana's Rule 7.3 requires that the
letter be identified as advertising material, both on the communication
itself and on the envelope, and requires the attorney to submit a copy
4. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(b)(2).
5. 237 So. 2d 301 (La. 1976).
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of the written communication to the association prior to, or when, the
material is first transmitted to any prospective client.
Attention should also be directed to the task force recommendation
of the continuation of the "Edwins rule," 6 which permitted the attorney
to advance funds to his client for humanitarian purposes. The supreme
court, however, declined to follow the recommendation and returned to
a prohibition against financial assistance except for advancement of court
costs and expenses of litigation. 7
Since our last symposium,' there have been many interesting decisions
by our appellate courts involving professional responsibility. Some of
these are reviewed below.
Pro. Bono
When the right to free counsel exploded in the 1960's, culminating
with Argersinger v. Hamlin,9 this writer observed that many partners
in prestigious law firms usually delegated court appointments to their
associates, particularly where the partner practiced on the civil side only.
Occasionally, a judge would insist that the appointed lawyer represent
the accused, but usually both the court and the accused recognized that
more competent representation would take place with the younger at-
torney.
Two recent cases touched upon this area, although they did not
decide the question of whether the appointment can be delegated. In
State v. Alcinder,'0 the supreme court, in granting a rehearing, stated
that the trial court must appoint a lawyer, not a law firm. Justice
Dennis, concurring, pointed out that individual defense counsel in crim-
inal cases should be appointed in order that an attorney will have
personal responsibility for the representation, rather than a firm or a
group, which would have only collective responsibility. In City of West
Monroe v. Conley," the third circuit held that the fact that an attorney
limits his practice to civil matters does not justify revocation of an
appointment to represent an accused in a criminal matter. The court
also held that an appointment against the will of an attorney does not
violate her constitutional rights.
The fifth circuit in State v. Weary12 reaffirmed the proposition that
a court has the inherent power to require an attorney to represent an
6. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Edwins, 329 So. 2d 437 (La. 1976).
7. La. R.S. 3 Y: Ch. 4 App., art. 16, R. 1.8(e) (1987).
8. Mengis, Developments in the Law, 1985-1986-Professional Responsibility, 47 La.
L. Rev. 415 (1986).
9. 407 U.S. 25, 92 S. Ct. 2006 (1972).
10. 507 So. 2d 1242 (La. 1987).
11. 491 So. 2d 785 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
12. 490 So. 2d 1121 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986).
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indigent, with or without compensation, as an obligation burdening his
privilege to practice and serve as an officer of the court. In State v.
Weary, it appears that the attorney appointed by the court to represent
three persons charged with violation of probation agreed to do so only
upon the condition that he be paid at the rate of $100.00 for each
defendant. With this figure being acceptable to the judge, the attorney
then presented a voucher to the indigent defender board of the parish
of Jefferson. Thereafter, the representation apparently took place, but
the indigent defender board refused to pay the fees because the trial
judge failed to follow the provisions of the indigent defender law set
forth in Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:14413 and following. After some
legal maneuvering, the trial court ordered the payment of the $300.00,
but the appellate court reversed, setting aside the award of compensation
because the trial court did not proceed as statutorily mandated. The
attorney was apparently never paid for his services.
Bernhardt v. Fourth Judicial District14 indicates that all is not well
in other parishes. The problem is usually underfunding of the indigent
defender board rather than overcharging by attorneys. Volunteer panels
will disappear if at least minimally reasonable compensation is not
available. By Act 94 in 1986, the legislature attempted to give the indigent
defender boards another option to solve the problem. The boards may
now contract with one or more lawyers or law firms to provide counsel
for all or a significant portion of indigent defendants. Whether this will
prove successful remains to be seen.
Effective Assistance of Counsel
It is now well settled that absent knowing and intelligent waiver,
no person may be imprisoned for any offense unless he was represented
by counsel at trial. 5 "Counsel," of course, means "effective counsel."
The two leading decisions in this area are Strickland v. Washington16
and United States v. Cronic. 7 In State v. Lowenfield,8 the accused
argued that his rights to effective assistance of counsel were violated
by his counsel's attempt to withdraw. He failed, however, to specify
any lapse in his counsel's performance which prejudiced his defense.
Citing the two part Strickland test, deficient performance and prejudice
to the client therefrom, the court found no merit in Lowenfield's as-
signment of error. In State v. Mitchell, 9 failure to object to certain
13. La. R.S. 15:144 (1981).
14. 501 So. 2d 1077 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
15. State v. Skeetoc, 501 So. 2d 931 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
16. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
17. 466 U.S. 648, 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984).
18. 495 So. 2d 1245 (La. 1985).
19. 498 So. 2d 1190 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
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testimony was urged by the defendant as evidence of ineffectiveness of
counsel. Again, the Strickland test was cited in the court's denial of
the assignment of error.
Even though effective assistance of counsel is fundamental in securing
a fair trial for an accused, the Supreme Court of the United States has
also held that this right may be waived.20 The procedure for waiving
counsel, however, must be followed very carefully, or the Court may
find that the accused did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right.
Before explaining the various rights which the accused is giving up by
pleading guilty, the trial court must first ascertain the level of the
defendant's literacy, competency, understanding, and volition. There-
after, the judge may explain the consequences of a plea of guilty and
accept the defendant's plea. 21*
Limitations on this right to effective counsel are pointed out in
State v. Balfa22 and State v. Delatt.23 An indigent defendant does not
have the right to have a particular attorney appointed to represent him.
The right to choose counsel only extends so far as to allow the accused
to retain the attorney of his choice if he can manage to do so. Even
that right is not absolute; it can neither be manipulated so as to obstruct
the orderly procedure of a court nor be used to obstruct the admin-
istration of justice. Accordingly, an attempt by an accused to dismiss
his appointed counsel a week before a scheduled trial will not be coun-
tenanced.
Finally, the United States Supreme Court, in Pennsylvania v. Finley,2 4
reiterated the rule that there is no constitutional right to counsel when
a prisoner mounts a collateral attack on his conviction.
Our cases establish that the right to appointed counsel extends
to the first appeal of right, and no further. Thus, we have
rejected suggestions that we establish a right to counsel on
discretionary appeals. We think that since a defendant has no
federal constitutional right to counsel when pursuing a discre-
tionary appeal on direct review of his conviction, a fortiori, he
has no such right when attacking a conviction that is long since
become final upon exhaustion of the appellate process. 21
20. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975).
21. State v. Skeetoe, 501 So. 2d 931, 936 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
22. 506 So. 2d 1369 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987).
23. 506 So. 2d 898 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
24. 107 S. Ct. 1990 (1987).
25. Id. at 1993 (citations omitted).
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Destruction or Concealment of Physical Evidence (Attorney-Client
Privilege)
In Re Ryder-6 was a disciplinary action in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Mr. Ryder was charged with
concealing stolen money and a sawed off shotgun used by his client in
a robbery in order to secure the acquittal of his client. Mr. Ryder argued
that his actions were protected by the attorney-client privilege since the
information concerning the whereabouts of the money and the shotgun
had come from his client. The court, in a landmark decision, held that
no rule of ethics or law permitted Mr. Ryder to conceal either the
money or the shotgun, inasmuch as the money was the fruit of the
crime and the shotgun was an instrumentality used in committing it.
That 'which can be seized from the hands of the client can be also
seized from the hands of the attorney.
The leading case on the subject prior to Ryder was State v. Olwell.27
The Washington Supreme Court had held in Olwell that, although an
attorney might take an instrumentality of the crime and hold it for a
reasonable period of time to examine it, to test it, and otherwise prepare
for trial, as an officer of the court he must thereafter turn the instru-
mentality over to the prosecution. The fact that the client delivered such
evidence to the attorney may be privileged, but the object itself does
not become privileged by reason of its transmission to the attorney.
It is evident from the above that an attorney has conflicting duties
when presented with physical evidence which may be incriminating to
his client. He obviously has the duty of loyalty to his client, but he
also has a duty of candor to the court. If the attorney fails to make
a thorough investigation which might turn up physical evidence, he is
certainly not being effective counsel from a constitutional standpoint,
and is also violating his ethical duties. On the other hand, if this thorough
investigation does turn up the physical evidence either from his client
or from some third person, the attorney finds himself on the horns of
a dilemma.
In the first situation, where the physical evidence is delivered by
the client or its location is made known to the attorney by the client,
the general rule is that the information imparted is privileged, but the
object itself is not. As a corollary, the attorney could not be compelled
to disclose how he came into possession of the physical evidence, but
he would be compelled to turn it over to the prosecution. Exceptions
to this rule are illustrated by People v. Meredith2 and the Louisiana
26. 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va. 1967).
27. 64 Wash. 2d 828, 394 P,2d 681 (1964).
28. 29 Cal. 3d 682, 631 P.2d 46, 175 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1981).
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case of State v. Taylor.29 The first exception occurs when a client
communicates the location of the physical evidence to his attorney in
a privileged communication and the attorney then removes or alters the
evidence. Since the prosecution would then be prevented from finding
the evidence in its original state, the California Supreme Court held in
Meredith that the attorney could be compelled to give evidence as to
where it was obtained, or what its state was at the time of its discovery.
The second exception, described in State v. Taylor, applies when the
attorney comes into possession of the evidence unlawfully as the result
of a lawyer's participation in a conspiracy to conceal it.
A second situation occurs when possibly incriminating evidence comes
into the possession of the attorney through a third person. The leading
cases are People v. Lee,30 Morrell v. State3' and Hitch v. Pima County
Superior Court.3 2 In Morrell, the Alaska Supreme Court held that a
criminal defense attorney has an obligation to turn over to the prose-
cution physical evidence that comes into his possession through the acts
of the third party who is neither a client of the attorney nor an agent
of the client. To the same effect was the holding in People v. Lee by
the California court. Both courts basically held that the attorney-client
privilege does not exist in such a situation. In both Morrell and Lee,
the attorney apparently had a choice either to take the physical evidence
or not, but an additional requirement was thrown in by the Arizona
court in Hitch. The defense attorney, said the court, has an affirmative
duty to take possession of the evidence from a third party and turn it
over to the prosecution unless the attorney is reasonably certain that
the third party will not conceal it or destroy it. This puts the defense
attorney in an extremely difficult position. He cannot simply turn his
back on the evidence. He must investigate to determine if it is potentially
incriminating and then, in addition, whether or not the third party might
destroy or conceal it. In effect, he must now switch sides to the pros-
ecution while ostensibly remaining loyal to his client.
A related problem is whether or not the defense attorney can be
put on the stand and forced to tell where he got the physical evidence
which he was compelled to deliver to the prosecution by virtue of his
ethical duties. The Hitch court went further and stated that if the attorney
would enter into a stipulation with the prosecution setting up the trail
of the evidence so as to make it admissible, he would not have to
testify. Yet, logically, the only thing to which the attorney could stipulate
is from whom he received it, for he would have no personal knowledge
29. 502 So. 2d 537 (La. 1987).
30. 3 Cal. App. 3d 514, 83 Cal. Rptr. 715 (1970).
31. 575 P.2d 1200 (Alaska 1978).
32. 146 Ariz. 588, 708 P.2d 72 (1985).
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as to where the third party did in fact find the evidence. To put it
mildly, for the defense attorney, Hitch will be a difficult decision with
which to live.
State v. Green,33 the companion case of State v. Taylor, involved
a situation where the gun used to commit a crime was delivered to the
attorney, who subsequently turned it over to the prosecution. After the
attorney had withdrawn from his representation, he was subpoenaed to
the trial of the matter and compelled to testify concerning his acquisition
of the weapon. The state contended that it had to lay a proper foundation
in order to connect the gun with the accused. The Supreme Court of
Louisiana returned to the general rule that where the incriminating
evidence was delivered by the client to the attorney in the course of
the attorney-client relationship, the state must prove the connection
between the evidence and the defendant without in any way relying on
the testimony of the client's attorney who initially received the evidence.
"The attorney may not be called to the stand and examined as to any
of the circumstances which preceded his possession and subsequent de-
livery to police of a piece of physical evidence-here the gun." '3 4 In
holding that the attorney was obligated to turn the evidence over to
the prosecution, the court relied on DR 1-102(A)(5), DR 7-102(A)(3),
DR 7-102(A)(7) and the recently adopted obstruction of justice statute,
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:130.1.35
The Taylor case also decided the interesting question as to what a
court should do when it suspects a conspiracy between the client and
the attorney to conceal physical evidence. Initially, Justice Cole wrote
for the court that the trial court should hold a full evidentiary hearing
at which the party opposing the privilege would have the burden of
proving the existence of the conspiracy. Upon a prima facie showing
of conspiracy, the attorney-client privilege would be vitiated pending
resolution of the merits of the claimed privilege. At the hearing, both
the attorney and the client may be called to testify if necessary, and
the attorney-client privilege may not be interposed as an obstacle to
examination. The trial court then must determine the merits of the claim
of conspiracy as any other question of fact. On rehearing, the majority
held that the evidentiary hearing should be in conformity with Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure article 703 and that proof of the alleged
conspiracy should be by a "preponderance of the evidence." Justice
Cole dissented because he felt that if there was in fact an ongoing crime
or conspiracy, there was no attorney-client privilege, and there could
be no breach of the constitutional requirement of "effective assistance";
33. 493 So. 2d 1178 (La. 1986).
34. Id. at 1184.
35. La. R.S. 14:130.1 (1986).
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consequently, no justification existed for using the motion to suppress
as the procedural vehicle. The majority, on the other hand, believed
that the importance of the attorney-client privilege justified the use of
the motion to suppress to test the admissibility of such communications
prior to trial.
Conflict of Interests
As pointed out in Rule 1.7 of Louisiana's new rules, loyalty is an
essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a client. Therefore, as
a general rule, a lawyer should not represent one client if the interests
of that client conflict with those of another client. Any dealings between
a lawyer and his client should be scrupulously fair to the client. As to
former clients, confidentiality must be preserved and none of the in-
formation which the lawyer received in the course of the representation
of the former client may be used against the former client in any present
representation of another client.
The relationship between an attorney and his client is intended to
be personal, unique, and fiduciary. As pointed out in Plaquemines Parish
Commission Council v. Delta Development Co.:36 "[I]n no other agency
relationship is a greater duty of trust imposed than in that involving
an attorney's duty to his client." ' 37 The Plaquemines Parish case was
before the Louisiana Supreme Court on an exception of prescription
which had been sustained in the lower courts. In the course of its
opinion, although the breach of fiduciary duty had been stipulated, the
court set forth the history of an attorney-client relationship which reeked
of conflict of interests wherein the attorney enriched himself to the
detriment of his client. Such matters will now be covered by Rule 1.8
relating to prohibited transactions between an attorney and his client.
A similar case is Boisdore v. Bridgeman,a8 wherein the jury found
that an attorney-client relationship existed and that the attorney had
violated the standards of professionalism, care, and fiduciary duty which
he owed to his client. In affirming, the appellate court, after outlining
the detailed business dealings between the attorney and his client, said:
Although an attorney may deal with his client and acquire
an interest in his client's property in exchange for services ren-
dered, his actions should be subjected to the most exacting
scrutiny. In such situations, the attorney is under a continuing
duty to fully inform his client of all aspects of the transaction.
Moreover, when a transaction between attorney and client is
36. 502 So. 2d 1034 (La. 1987).
37. Id. at 1040.
38. 502 So. 2d 1149 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987).
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attacked, the burden is on the attorney to prove that the trans-
action was made in the best of faith without disadvantage to
the client; that it was fair and equitable; and that the client
was fully informed of his rights and so was able to deal with
the attorney at arms length.3 9
The jury awarded a total of $243,000 in damages against the attorney,
but this amount was reduced by the trial court to the sum of $150,000.
The judgment n.o.v. by the trial court was reversed, and the jury award
was reinstated by the court of appeal.
Rule 3.7 establishes the general rule that a lawyer shall not act as
an advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary
witness. Although there are exceptions to the rule, it is generally advisable
for the attorney who is likely to be called as a witness to terminate the
representation. In Hebert v. First Guaranty BanlI ° a motion was made
to disqualify the plaintiff's counsel on the basis that his testimony was
needed at trial, by both his own client and by the defendants, on two
related subjects. The trial court denied the motion, and the appellate
court, after an examination of the record, found that trial counsel's
role had not been compromised to such an extent as to require dis-
qualification.
Another interesting facet of the Hebert case, concerning the duty
of an appointed counsel in attempting to locate an absentee defendant,
was brought out more fully in Judge Lanier's dissenting opinion. 4 1
Simplified, the question is whether appointed counsel must go beyond
the pleadings which are served upon him, or whether he simply can
take the avenue of least resistance and put an ad in the paper. At least
the dissenting judge felt that the court-appointed counsel failed to use
reasonable diligence in not contacting the plaintiff bank, or its attorney,
to see if they had any information omitted from the petition which
might help him locate the defendant. Since due process standards in
giving notice are now being looked at carefully, attorneys appointed to
represent an absentee should explore every conceivable avenue to locate
the defendant.
Attorney's Fees
The shootout between the Louisiana Supreme Court and the Lou-
isiana legislature over who has the right to control attorneys' fees stip-
ulated in a promissory note continued during 1986-87. In our last
39. Id. at 1154-55 (citations omitted).
40. 493 So. 2d 150 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
41. Id. at 158.
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symposium 42 we discussed Graham v. Sequoya Corp.43 and the most
recent amendment to article 2000 of the Louisiana Civil Code. The last
sentence of that article now reads: "If the parties, by written contract,
have expressly agreed that the obligor shall also be liable for the obligee's
attorney fees in a fixed or determinable amount, the obligee is entitled
to that amount as well."" The reader should notice that the attorney's
fee obligation flows to the obligee of the promissory note and not to
the attorney. This is in accord with such cases as American General
Investment Co. v. St. Elmo Lands,45 McCarthy v. Louisiana Timeshare
Venture, Inc. ,46 and First National Bank of Lafayette v. Doni Homes,
Inc.47 It certainly could be construed as a legislative overruling of General
Investments, Inc. v. Thomas" and Jefferson Bank and Trust Co. v.
Post.49
The fireworks began with the first circuit case of Central Progressive
Bank v. Bradley.5 ° In this case, Judge Lanier reviewed the jurisprudence
and the legislative enactments, and concluded that the attorney's fee
stipulated in both the mortgage and the promissory note was owned by
the holder of the note and not the attorney. Judge Lanier not only
relied upon the legislative amendment of article 2000, but also upon
DR 5-103 which prohibited the holder's attorney from acquiring a pro-
prietary interest in the obligation sued upon. In all of the writer's
experience as a practicing attorney, he has never seen a judgment on
a promissory note stipulating an attorney's fee which divided the award
between the holder of the note and a particular attorney. It would make
just as much sense to add a third party to the judgment, such as the
clerk of court for the court costs.
Unfortunately, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Central Progressive
Bank," a per curiam opinion, reversed the appellate court decision,
holding that the prohibition against excessive attorney fees cannot be
abrogated by a law fixing the amount of attorney fees as a percentage
of the amount to be collected. "Notwithstanding Article 2000, the courts
may inquire into the reasonableness of such a fee." '5 2 The writer does
not disagree with the proposition that courts may always look into the
42. Mengis, supra note 8, at 420.
43. 478 So. 2d 1223 (La. 1985).
44. La. Civ. Code art. 2000.
45. 391 So. 2d 570 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
46. 426 So. 2d 1342 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
47. 338 So. 2d 1202 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
48. 422 So. 2d 1279 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982).
49. 312 So. 2d 907 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
50. 496 So. 2d 525 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
51. 502 So. 2d 1017 (La. 1987).
52. Id.
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reasonableness of the attorney's fee, and admittedly, the supreme court
does not say in Progressive that the fee stipulated in a promissory note
belongs to the attorney. However, that is precisely the holding of Walker
v. Investment Properties, Ltd. 3 If this case is to be followed, an attorney,
having been designated by the holder of the note, should include himself
as a party plaintiff in the suit on the note. If he does not, the debtor
may except to that part of the claim which the holder presents for
attorney's fees since the fees are an obligation in favor of the attorney
rather than the holder.
All of this confusion actually stems from the "American Rule,"
which provides that attorney's fees are never shifted unless there is a
contractual provision or a statute which so provides. This is also the
general rule in Louisiana.14 Financial institutions are obviously interested
in shifting their attorney fees to the debtor in the same manner that
parties to a purchase agreement or a building contract would be interested
in shifting the costs of their attorneys to the losing or breaching party.
In none of those situations should a separate cause of action arise in
some attorney yet to be designated. The supreme court could still inquire
into the reasonableness of any attorney's fee, which the holder of the
note or the contracting party had obligated itself to pay, without creating
any specific cause of action in the attorney. This seems to be the
approach taken by the court in Scott v. Noel. 5
In any event, considering the cases just mentioned, the statement
in Bank of St. Charles v. Fire Protection Systems, Inc. ,56 that the well
established prior jurisprudence was brought back from its judicial grave
by the Louisiana legislature, seems to be premature since the supreme
court in Progressive calls upon its constitutional powers to slam the
door on the legislature.
Two other cases consolidated for trial, McNamara v. Stauffer Chem-
ical Co. 7 and City of Baton Rouge v. Stauffer Chemical Co.," dem-
onstrate that the court will not only interfere in private contracts where
attorney's fees are an issue, but also in the statutory award of attorney's
fees. The trial judge had rejected the provisions of Louisiana Revised
Statutes 47:1512,19 which mandates a ten percent attorney's fee where
private counsel is employed by the tax collecting body, and instead fixed
as the attorney's fee, $50,000. The difference in the statutorily set fee
and the fee set by the court was over $600,000. Although the trial court
53. 507 So. 2d 850 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987).
54. Nassau Realty Co. v. Brown, 332 So. 2d 206 (La. 1976).
55. 506 So. 2d 1313 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
56. 497 So. 2d 25 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986).
57. 500 So. 2d 397 (La. 1987).
58. 506 So. 2d 1252 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
59. La. R.S. 47:1512 (1970).
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had held the provisions of the statute to be unconstitutional, the supreme
court rejected that approach and simply held that its provisions are
subject to judicial scrutiny, on a case by case basis, regarding whether
the attorney's fee as mandated by law is reasonable and not excessive
under the circumstances. 60
Several other attorney's fee cases merit a passing glance. In Walton
v. Walton, 61 the court held that a client's medical bills, whether advanced
by the attorney or guaranteed by him, were not covered by the attorney's
privilege and form no part of the attorney's fee. In Sims v. Selvage,62
the court held that, although an attorney is not prohibited by the Code
of Professional Responsibility from advancing costs of litigation and
medical treatment to his client, the refusal or failure to do so by the
attorney is not good cause to discharge him. The court cited Louisiana
State Bar Association v. Edwins;63 it might be well to reiterate that the
effect of that decision has been terminated by the adoption of the new
rules. In Phillips v. Rowe,64 an attorney who had voluntarily terminated
his practice of law for health reasons and had failed to pay his Louisiana
State Bar Association dues was denied a claim for referral fees for a
case he had referred to another attorney prior to his discontinuance of
practice. The court relied on the prohibition against sharing of legal
fees with a non-lawyer, concluding that the plaintiff was a "non-lawyer"
even though he still had a valid certificate to practice law. In Sessions,
Fishman, Rosenson, Boisfontaine, and Nathan v. Taddonio,65 the court
approved the practice of charging a client for time spent on a case by
an associate of the attorney who was actually hired. It seems rather
strange that the client should complain since undoubtedly the hourly
rate of the associate, who had recently been admitted to practice, was
considerably less than that which would have been charged had the
retained attorney done the same work.
Malpractice
A movement which is gaining considerable support throughout the
United States is the recognition of rules of ethics as rules of law. One
of its chief proponents is Professor L. Ray Patterson, Pope Brock
Professor of Law at the University of Georgia School of Law.6 6 Professor
60. 500 So. 2d at 401.
61. 490 So. 2d 1093 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
62. 499 So. 2d 325 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
63. 329 So. 2d 437 (La. 1976).
64. 499 So. 2d 208 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986).
65. 490 So. 2d 526 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
66. Patterson, Wanted: A New Code of Professional Responsibility, 63 A.B.A.J. 639
(1977); see also Patterson, supra note 2.
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Patterson confesses that one major barrier to the bar's acceptance of
the rules of ethics as rules of law is concern for their use as a basis
for lawyer liability even though both the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility and the Model Rules contain caveats against this possibility. That
very assertion, that the attorney was guilty of malpractice for having
violated EC 2-23, was made in Reed v. Verwoerdt.67 In rejecting the
contention, the court said "[tihus far, however the Louisiana Supreme
Court has not viewed the Code of Professional Responsibility as for-
mulated malpractice rules." '6s It is difficult to see any logical distinction
between using ethical rules to modify contracts or statutory enactments
and using ethical rules for malpractice liability. The Reed case also
illustrates one of the disadvantages of filing suit against a client for
unpaid legal fees, as the client may fight back with a reconventional
demand asserting malpractice by the attorney.
As usual, quite a few of the malpractice cases within the last year
dealt with the question of prescription. It is now fairly well settled that
the usual prescriptive period against an attorney is one year. However,
when an attorney expressly warrants a particular result (e.g., guarantees
winning a lawsuit, guarantees title to property, guarantees or warrants
the ultimate legal effect of his work product, or agrees to perform
certain work and does nothing whatsoever), then clearly there is a ten-
year prescriptive period. 69 In addition, it has been held that prescription
does not begin to run until damages are sustained, 70 or, as stated by
Chief Justice Dixon in Succession of Albritton,'7  prescription against
attorney malpractice could not begin to run until the client had reason
to doubt the accuracy of her attorney's advice.
The third circuit applied both of the above principles in Olivier v.
National Union Fire Insurance Co. ,72 wherein an attorney was sued for
malpractice because of his omission of a critical provision in the act of
surrender executed by the natural mother prior to an adoption pro-
ceeding. The court first considered that it was a negligence action which
was prescribed by one year, but then went on to hold that prescription
did not begin until there was a final judgment against the adopting
parents. The adoption was being handled by the same attorney who
was being sued for malpractice.
67. 490 So. 2d 421 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986).
68. Id. at 427.
69. Cherokee Restaurant v. Pierson, 428 So. 2d 995 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983), writ
denied, 431 So. 2d 773 (La. 1983).
70. Rayne State Bank and Trust Co. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 483 So. 2d 987
(La. 1986).
71. 498 So. 2d 742 (La. 1986).
72. 499 So. 2d 1330 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
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Due to the continuing attorney-client relationship between the
Oliviers and Gibbs, we find that the civilian doctrine of contra
non valentum comes into play to suspend the running of pre-
scription until such time that the Oliviers could practically have
brought a malpractice suit against Gibbs, i.e. upon the termi-
nation of the attorney-client relationship."
In Barre v. St. Martin,74 the court found that prescription did not begin
to run until the plaintiff had been evicted from immovable property
and that the suit had been filed within one year from that date. The
exception of prescription, sustained by the trial court, was reversed. A
malpractice suit against a notary public who allegedly prepared a de-
fective assumption deed was maintained against a plea of prescription;
the malpractice action had been filed within one year from the time
the petitory action was filed against the property owner, who was then
obligated to defend or lose the disputed property."
Lawyers who issue title opinion letters may take some comfort in
Crawford v. Gray and Associates,76 wherein the second circuit followed
the Cherokee Restaurant77 case in its holding that when an attorney
states in a title opinion letter that "according to my examination ...
has a valid and merchantable title," he has not expressly warranted or
guaranteed title to property so as to fall within the ten year prescriptive
period. Practitioners should look at their form of title opinion letter
and make sure that it is not stated in the form of a guaranty or
warranty, but is stated in the form of an opinion by the attorney.
In this day and time attorneys should always be wary of conflicts
of interest, particularly when the attorney's interests conflict with the
client's interests. If full disclosure is not made and the case turns out
badly, such conflicts are an open invitation to a malpractice suit. As
stated in Dier v. Hamilton,"7 the Code of Professional Responsibility
imposes a duty upon attorneys to disclose possible conflicts of interest.
The plaintiff alleged that she had an attorney-client relationship with
the subject attorney. She accused the attorney of negligence and profes-
sional impropriety for allegedly giving her improper and partial legal
advice due to his own financial interests and his representation of clients
with adverse interests. The trial court had sustained an exception of no
cause of action which was reversed by the second circuit.
Finally, attorneys should be careful in selecting their malpractice
insurer. In First Guaranty Bank v. Attorney's Liability Assurance So-
73. Id. at 1337.
74. 499 So. 2d 607 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986).
75. Succession of LaSalle v. Clark, 503 So. 2d 694 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1987).
76. 493 So. 2d 734 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986).
77. Cherokee Restaurant, Inc. v. Pierson, 428 So. 2d 995 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
78. 501 So. 2d 1059 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
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ciety,19 the malpractice insurer filed an exception to the personal juris-
diction over it by the Orleans Parish Civil District Court. On appeal,
the fourth circuit sustained the objection, holding that the insurer was
not transacting business in Louisiana within the meaning of the Louisiana
Insurance Code. The supreme court has granted writs, but in the mean-
time there has to be considerable concern as to whether or not the
attorney has insurance.
Discipline
The report filed by the Committee on Professional Responsibility
in the June issue of the Louisiana Bar Journal shows that over forty
disciplinary actions were pending.80 In the last year, ten supreme court
decisions were published which involved the suspension or disbarment
of members of the Louisiana State Bar Association. Three attorneys
were disbarred for commingling and converting their clients' funds to
their own use. 81 The only somewhat unusual feature of these cases was
the "disbarment of an already disbarred attorney." Mr. Krasnoff had
been disbarred in 1986,82 but other matters were then pending. The court
had to consider whether it was appropriate to address charges of mis-
conduct instituted while the lawyer was a member of the Bar, but
presented to the supreme court after a disbarment on other charges.
Looking at the underlying purpose of lawyer discipline, the court con-
cluded that it was proper for it to entertain the matter and extended
the period of time during which Mr. Krasnoff could not petition for
readmittance to five years from the date of the most recent disbarment.
In eight other matters, the supreme court imposed suspensions vary-
ing from eighteen months to three years.83 In Louisiana State Bar Ass'n
v. Henrichs,14 Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Lyons,85 and Louisiana State
Bar Ass'n v. Carpenter,8 6 discipline was imposed because of the attorney's
79. 506 So. 2d 595 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987), writ granted, 508 So. 2d 56 (1987).
80. Report by the Comm. on Prof'l Resp., La. B.J. (June 1987).
81. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Krasnoff, 502 So. 2d 1018 (La. 1987); Louisiana
State Bar Ass'n v. Schmidt, 506 So. 2d 1186 (La. 1987); and Louisiana State Bar Ass'n
v. Simons, 495 So. 2d 936 (La. 1986).
82. Krasnoff, 488 So. 2d at 1002.
83. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Riley, 500 So. 2d 753 (La. 1987); Louisiana State
Bar Ass'n v. Stewart, 500 So. 2d 360 (La. 1987); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Carpenter,
502 So. 2d 1023 (La. 1987); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Tilly, 507 So. 2d 182 (La.
1987); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Lyons, 491 So. 2d 369 (La. 1986); Louisiana State
Bar Ass'n v. Williams, 498 So. 2d 727 (La. 1986); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Henrichs,
495 So. 2d 943 (La. 1986); and Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Price, 495 So. 2d 1311
(La. 1986).
84. Henrichs, 495 So. 2d 943.
85. Lyons, 491 So. 2d 369.
86. Carpenter, 502 So. 2d 1023.
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neglect or failure to perform the legal services for which he had been
hired. In Carpenter and Lyons the charges also included lying to the
clients concerning the progress of the matter.
In Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Tilly 7 and Louisiana State Bar
Ass'n v. Price8 both Tilley and Price had both been convicted of
serious criminal charges. Tilley received a suspension of two years, and
Price, a suspension of twenty-five months. The attorney in Louisiana
State Bar Ass'n v. Riley 9 received a three year suspension for conversion
of client funds and was also required to make full restitution. In Lou-
isiana State Bar Ass'n v. Stewart,90 Stewart, without any prompting and
with no one breathing down his neck, confessed to subornation of
perjury. The underlying problem was severe alcoholism. The court stated
that the appropriate penalty for perjury and suborning perjury is gen-
erally disbarment. After considering Mr. Stewart's effort to solve his
drinking problem, his voluntary disclosure of his misconduct, and the
fact that his disclosure prevented any damage from occurring to any
third parties, the court ordered an eighteen month suspension.
A rather unusual sanction was imposed in Louisiana State Bar Ass'n
v. Williams.9' The court found that Mr. William's ignorance as much
as his lack of dedication to the ethical precepts contributed to his failure
to adhere to the ideals of the profession. Mr. Williams had handled
matters in which his own interests were in conflict with the interests of
his client, had not made full disclosure of the conflict, and was guilty
of dishonesty, deceit, and misrepresentation. A suspension of two years
was imposed, but at the end of that two years, Mr. Williams must not
only have made restitution to clients who were damaged by his actions,
but also have attained a satisfactory score on the Multistate Professional
Responsibility Exam to be taken as directed by the Committee on
Professional Responsibility.
Conclusion
In the Code of Professional Responsibility can be found the fol-
lowing: "In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a
lawyer shall not ... [flail to comply with known local customs of
courtesy or practice of the bar or a particular tribunal without giving
to opposing counsel timely notice of his intention not to comply." 92
This provision was omitted from the Model Rules because it was con-
87. 507 So. 2d 182 (La. 1987).
88. 495 So. 2d 1311 (La. 1986).
89. 500 So. 2d 753 (La. 1987).
90. 500 So. 2d 360 (La. 1987).
91. Williams, 498 So. 2d 727.
92. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-106(C)(5) (1980).
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sidered too vague to be a rule of conduct enforceable as law. Here is
another indication that the old concept of ethics as a branch of moral
science, including an interest in the disciplines of philosophy, theology,
literature, and history, is quietly passing away and being replaced by
black letter rules which require no knowledge of those disciplines. In
two recent cases, one from the first circuit 93 and one from the third
circuit, 94 both courts held that the mere taking of a default judgment
without notice to opposing counsel of the intention of doing so does
not, of itself, constitute fraud or an illicit practice which would serve
to nullify a default judgment. The writer concedes that as a decision
under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2004, the court's opinion
is correct. The writer would further concede that Rule 3.4 of the Lou-
isiana rules does not specifically cover this situation. However, in the
comment to Rule 3.4, fair competition is stressed, and although all of
the facts leading up to the confirmation in each case are not brought
out by the decisions, one cannot help but wonder if loyalty to the client
should not be tempered more with loyalty to the system of justice and
fairness to opposing parties.
93. Alfonso v. Cement Prods. Servs., Inc., 499 So. 2d 305 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
94. Herman v. Louisiana Health Serv. and Indem. Co., 492 So. 2d 250 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1986).
1987]

